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Abstract: Until the wave of political violence in 2018, the Nicaraguan model for community-based policing
(COP) was viewed by many as the means by which the country had avoided the crime and insecurity
reported elsewhere in Central America. Paralleling these positive claims, the Nicaraguan National Police
have emphasized particular characteristics of the COP model as the basis of this success. The Nicaraguan
COP model is founded on three ethical pillars i.e. that it is communitarian, proactive and preventative.
In this article, we detail the development of the Nicaraguan community-policing model and evaluate its
historical and persisting significance as the guarantor of law and order through a critical evaluation of these
claims and characteristics. The article demonstrates the abiding significance of the Nicaraguan COP model,
and the distinctive nature of its operation. In contrast to prevailing regional trends there is much to learn
from policing that emphasizes dialogue with the community over a reliance on technological or strong-arm
solutions. However, the article also observes severe challenges regarding its current capacities and its
erosion as a result of the pressures of presidential authoritarianism, political corruption and securitization.
This erosion of the COP model has negatively affected the conditions of human security in Nicaragua and
is a significant factor explaining the character of recent violence.
Keywords: civil unrest; community-based policing; crime; Nicaragua; security
1. Introduction
Multiple publications have claimed in recent years that
Nicaragua had escaped the wave of crime and insecurity
suffered by its neighbors [1–3]. The Nicaraguan model for
community-based policing (COP) was heralded in particular
as a success story in a series of reports written by interna-
tional organizations [4,5]. A series of donor institutions also
praised the Nicaraguan community-based policing model.
They suggest that the COP model is a key reason why the
country has been able to avoid the serious conditions of
organized crime, violence and homicide registered in the
Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala, El Salvador and
Honduras) [6,7]. The recent wave of political unrest and multi-
ple violent clashes between the national police and protesters
that have left over ca. 400 people dead [8] suggests that
these claims were overstated. These events have taken
many observers by surprise. However, as we observe below
recognition of a series of political reforms and changes to
police practice, and the Nicaraguan community based model
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in particular, assist explanation of both the country’s earlier
success in combatting violent crime and the current national
crisis in political and public order.
Drawing on recent qualitative research [9], in this article
we critically consider what is distinctive about the Nicaraguan
COP model. In order to consider its strengths and weak-
nesses the article evaluates the Nicaraguan COP model’s
own claims to distinction i.e. that its success is based on
homegrown foundations of policing as communitarian, proac-
tive and preventative. The article initially explores the re-
gional setting for community based policing. The article pro-
ceeds from this to a direct exploration of the distinctive origins
and nature of Nicaragua’s COP model. The Nicaraguan COP
model is as much the product of the Sandinista Revolution
as later attempts in sync with regional trends towards profes-
sionalization and institutional reform. Attention is furthermore
given to each of the claims regarding the model’s foundations
and consideration made whether current dynamics sustain
or problematize their function. In progressing through an
analysis of each of the model’s foundational claims it should
be evident that the article aims to form a balanced critique of
the Nicaraguan COP model. As such, recognition is made
of its achievements, but also evidences made of internal
institutional challenges and new external threats. In con-
clusion, we furthermore highlight how the recent reform of
security policy and changing police practice have had severe
consequences for the conditions of human security in the
country. The recent turn from COP to a reactive form of
policing has heightened tensions between local communities
and the police and contributed to the violent episodes that
have taken place in the country in recent months.
2. A Safe Haven in a Violent Region
Efforts to reform the police forces in Latin America multi-
plied throughout the region in the 1990s [12], encouraged
by the return to democratic rule of law across the region in
the same period. The wave of reform matches the trend
for the introduction of COP programs in other post-conflict
contexts elsewhere in the world [13]. The signing of peace
accords between the governments and armed opposition in
El Salvador and Guatemala respectively in 1991 and 1996
was particularly significant for police reform. In both cases,
the peace accords stipulated the creation of new civilian
police forces to replace the former police forces that had
operated under the auspices of the military. In the years that
followed, initiatives of police reform extended throughout the
rest of the region. These processes of reform were strongly
influenced by two main trends in international policing.
On the one hand a COP model was adopted based on
practices developed in North America and Europe during
the 1980s. This model was strongly supported by multilat-
eral institutions such as the Inter-American Development
Bank, which saw the change as an appropriate path to-
wards more democratic policing [14]. COP aimed to deal
with the causes of crime rather than simply responding to
it- by empowering citizens, building police community part-
nerships, improving social services and generating better
crime statistics [15]. Street patrols, policy councils and
youth services are some of the many programs adopted by
Latin American COP models [15]. In Latin America devel-
opments focused on COP were often paralleled by another
trend towards professionalization and the formation of spe-
cialized units—sometimes with renewed linkages to the
military. In response to public and media pressure and reac-
tionary political leadership there has also been a tendency
to resort to militarized responses. These initiatives rely on
reactionary and repressive policies that seek immediate
short-term results [16].
Nicaragua does not depart from the general pattern in
the region in which states have placed an emphasis on the
professionalization of the police and engaged the armed
forces in public security tasks. Its adoption of a COP model
does, however, predate others in the region. Indeed, in-
stead of an emphasis on force, technology and spending
[17], Nicaragua contrasts with other Latin American coun-
tries due to its long-term development of a model centered
on state-community relations. According to the National
Police its ethical aims of prevention and foundation in the
community not only permeates the actions of individual
police officers, but also guides the structure, organization,
deployment and entire philosophy of the national police
force [18]. The Nicaraguan Police claim that it is the combi-
nation of communitarian, preventive and proactive policing
that is at the foundation of its success in retaining order.
Put simply it is in this way the police can work “from the
community, for the community and with the community” [19].
Commonly the Nicaraguan police and government—
paralleled by elements of the donor community including the
Swedish Department for International Development (SIDA),
Norwegian Department of International Development (No-
rad) and the European Union—evidenced the success of
the Nicaraguan COP model by highlighting the relatively low
levels of homicide in the country. Nicaragua registered its
lowest homicide rate during the last 15 years in 2014 with 8
murders per 100,000 residents, according to statistics from
a police report released in April 2015 [20]. Official statistics
from 2016 suggest a further drop to a total of 453 homicides
i.e. 7 per 100,000 [21]. These tendencies are contrasted
with the rising figures registered in the Northern Triangle (El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) [22]. According to po-
lice data, these countries collectively saw 17,422 murders
in 2015, 11% more than in 2014 [23].
3. A Communitarian Police Force
Existing studies recognize that the shape and practice of
the Nicaraguan COP model is not only the result of moves
towards professionalism sparked by the broader trend for
COP in the 1990s, but also the result of several generations
of change and reform [24–26]. Secondary sources reviewed
for this article also commonly connect the “communitarian”
origins of the police force with the country’s experience of
the Sandinista Revolution (1978–1990) [27]. Whilst one of
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three Central American countries to pass through a period
of civil war, Nicaragua is distinct from the others given that
the Sandinistas not only managed to politically leverage a
peace deal, but to militarily succeed in taking power through
revolution. The success of the Sandinista Revolution in tak-
ing power and its introduction of a political system built on
ideas of socialism are significant in providing an explana-
tion for the basis for policing and security established in the
post-conflict period. This also contrasts with the timing and
origins of COP models adopted in the Northern Triangle.
Although the ideological and religious basis of the govern-
ment has been periodically challenged—both politically and
through armed insurrection (Contras war 1981–1990)—the
inheritance of ideas resulting from the Sandinista revolution
remain evident in current political practice and dialogue.
Cuadra [28] highlights that before the triumph of the
Sandinista Revolution, Nicaragua did not have an institu-
tion that assumed the functions of an independent police
force. In the period of the Somoza government, the National
Guard carried out these activities as part of its function to
secure the internal order of the country; but without special-
isation, political independence and the autonomy exercised
by the military. It also lacked structure, organisation and
clearly defined tasks in this regard. The National Guard
is the immediate successor of the “Constabulary” that was
created by the United States during their occupation of the
country (1912–1933). The Constabulary was founded in
1927 in the context of US intervention, as an armed body
that fused together all policing and military functions. This
apparatus continued for four years after the retraction of the
US Marines (1937) and remained an institution loyal to the
service of the governing Somoza regime.
The defeat of the Anastasio Somoza dictatorship also
marked the end of the National Guard, and their substitu-
tion by the Sandinista Popular Army and the Sandinista
Police. The Sandinista Police were founded on the 5th of
September 1979. With their establishment, the new govern-
ment aimed to end the history of open repression carried
out by the earlier National Guard. The first police officers
of the new national force were mainly young people who
had participated actively in the insurrection against the So-
moza regime. Although very different from the National
Guard, the new police force also submitted themselves to
the governing class and their leadership. From 1979 on-
wards, the Sandinista government decided to separate the
functions of defence and security from that of public order.
This resulted in the creation of the Ministry of Defence and
the Sandinista Popular Army; and the Ministry of the Inte-
rior and the Sandinista Police. The New Sandinista Police
force initially counted on the advice and training of Panama,
but its equipment and professional training drew mostly
on socialist policy (and particularly the example of Cuba).
From 1979 to 1989, the police force was formally tasked “to
guarantee the status quo and property with revolutionary
sentiment, confront crime and assist the task of securing
the state” [28].
Speaking about this period of time a former police officer
recounted the following in an interview [29]:
“What they created was a system to defend the revo-
lution. Everyone was to defend the Revolution and local
defence committees were initially structured to provide
labour towards the construction and maintenance of basic
services, water, light, the street etc. Following this they
started with the distribution of basic food stuffs and efforts to
defend the revolution through neighbourhood supervision”.
Throughout the 1980s the police formed part of the
broad defence of the revolution in which they were assigned
the task of preventing crime and counter-revolutionary ac-
tivities. This was implemented with a strong emphasis on
participation from the public. In response to the drastic eco-
nomic measures adopted by the Nicaraguan government at
the end of the 1980s and with the aim of counteracting the
legacy of war, the Sandinista Police started a process of
experimentation in which a significant reduction was made
of its technical, human and material capacities. Significant
cuts were made to the budgets of all parts of the state appa-
ratus. At the same time there was an increase in the level
of crime. This in turn influenced the capacity and attitude of
the police force to exercise the functions with which it had
been entrusted.
With limited resources and personnel the Nicaraguan
National Police (PNN) was forced to decentralise its re-
sponses to crime and manifestations of insecurity. It did
this by establishing broad and permanent channels of com-
munication with the community, both through the formation
of community-assemblies and maintaining direct links with
local residents. In the 1980s, the Nicaraguan police intro-
duced two important elements of their current COP model
i.e. committees for the defence of the revolution (Comites
por la defenda de la revolucio´n—later to become Commit-
tees for Citizen Power-CPCs) and jefes de sector (heads
of sector). Whereas the committees would become a key
point of articulation between the police and the families, the
heads of sector would become specialists in public neigh-
bourhood security.
In 1989, the police force’s position in relation to the
Ministry of the Interior was ratified by Law No.65 “Law of
the Functions of the Sandinista Police” in which it was
defined as an “organ of the Ministry of the Interior”. In
contrast to its earlier formal remit to defend the state and
popular revolution, the police were now tasked with the
protection of the life and physical integrity of the country’s
civilian inhabitants. They therefore assumed responsibil-
ity for the prevention of crime and preservation of public
order. The police were also expected to embody the par-
ticular and social values of the country and to provide
assistance to other state institutions to comply with the
law and to carry out their legal obligations.
In 1990s, following an intense process of transformation
and institutional modernization, the relationship between
the police and community was redefined yet again. It is
important to note the coincidence of these changes with
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the election of the liberal Chamorro government (1990–
1997). The Chamorro government rejected the socialist
premise of the earlier government and of its efforts to orga-
nize the masses. During this process the National Police
implemented the concept of public security as its principal
doctrine and established the conception and philosophy
of public service and prevention. As such the new model
was, as one interviewee has commented, “aimed at 1. de-
politicizing the national police and 2. removing party-based
alliances”. The intentions of professionalization and mod-
ernisation of the police was further accompanied by an
effort to strengthen human resources in organisational as-
pects, as well as improvements in candidate selection and
training. In this period they also formally introduced a focus
on gender equity as a crosscutting theme within the organi-
zation and actions of the National Police [30]. In addition,
the Police based their legal foundation on a newly reformed
political constitution [31]: “The National Police is a armed
body of civil nature. It has as its mission the guarantee of
internal order, the security of the citizenry, the prevention
and prosecution of crime and other activities specified by
law”. The police doctrine is founded clearly in the service
of the community and signals that the work of the police
only makes sense through its extensive relationship with
it. The Law of the National Police defines clearly how to
“secure exchanges and collaboration with different civil soci-
ety organisations with an aim to the joint implementation of
solutions to the problems faced by communities” [32]. The
Police further strengthened their relations with civil society
and established further points of coordination on issues of
crime prevention. Particular attention was given to the intra-
family and sexual violence. This process culminated in the
creation of the Mother and Child Stations. These stations
were born out of a joint initiative between the civil society
and the National Police, as spaces that provide integrated
attention to the victims and survivors of intra-family and
sexual violence.
In the process of modernization, the National Police pro-
posed the institutionalisation of the issue of gender in the
institutions policies and practices. This is described as a
search for a better symmetry in relations between women
and men within the institution, and the articulation of an
increased role for women in police work [33]. The process
of professionalization of the national police in the 1990s
also included the introduction of a programme aimed at
the prevention of adolescent crime. In 1995 the national
police introduced a strategy targeting adolescent crime and
related gang violence. In contrast to other Central Ameri-
can countries, adolescent crime was recognised not only
an issue of public order, but as a social problem. The pro-
gramme aimed to address the issue of adolescent crime
not by force, but through a system of youth education and
promotion. The police established a number of Centres of
Youth Formation and Development (Centros de Formacio´n
y Desarrollo Juvenil) where adolescents identified by their
families and the police were encouraged to enter vocational
training programmes and a system of follow up and super-
vision by designated police officers [34].
These developments lead up to the formal introduction
of the current Preventative Community Policing model. On
the 20th November 2001, following Decree No 0426-2001,
the Director General of the National Police, First Comman-
der Edwin Cordero Ardila established the Integrated Police-
Community Policy. This policy is conceived of as an in-
strument permitting the promotion of a change of attitude
amongst members of the Police, and the facilitation of direct
relations between the police and the community in order
to achieve its institutional mission with increased efficiency
and efficacy. Guido [35] indicates that the stated aim of this
policy is to contribute to the improvements of the quality
of life of the population, and particularly with regards to
citizens’ security, guaranteeing the relationship between
the institution of the police with the communities, putting in
place preventative work and activities aimed at optimizing
the quality of police services. The main features of the
policy are based on the establishment of social relations
connecting with the interests of different social groups in
the community: the prevention of crime at the level of the
community; a focus on gender and prevention amongst chil-
dren and youths; respecting human rights and constitutional
guarantees for individuals under police custody and their
families [35].
In 2003 a further important ingredient of the current
COP model was added. Family assemblies (Gabinetes de
la Familia, la Comunidad y la Vida) would replace the earlier
functions of the CPCs. According to official statistics there
are now more than 100,000 people within the network of
“social prevention” constituted by the family assemblies and
other related community assemblies [36].
The central goal of the current model is the operational-
ization, mainstreaming and integration of COP as a joint
action in all areas of specialisation within the national police.
It has its formal expression in the operative plans imple-
mented at the level of sector, municipality, delegation and
police district, and national level. The relationship between
police and community is established principally through
visits to homes, community and religious leaders, organi-
zations for social education and protection of children and
women, amongst others. It encourages the open participa-
tion of men and women and their proactive contribution in
proposals for prevention and solution of different problems
that affect their rights and freedoms.
3.1. Still True to the Community?
Daniel Ortega, one of the key leaders of the insurrection
against Somoza and the first post-revolution president in
1984, returned to the Presidency in 2007. In compliance
with President Ortega’s orders, in July 2014 Nicaragua’s
National Assembly approved a new law largely returning
control over the country’s police force to the President. This
move has sparked accusations by political opponents that
the new law removes the institution’s independence and
increases the risk of police corruption through political ties.
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The “Law of Organization, Functions, Career, and Special
Regimen of Security of the National Police” makes the pres-
ident “supreme commander” of the institution, alongside
other clauses that restructure and provide institutional sup-
port for the police force. The legislation also replaces the
National Police Law dating from 1996, under which the po-
lice fell under the control of Nicaragua’s Interior Ministry.
The new laws eliminated the supervision and intermedia-
tion of the Interior Ministry (Ministerio de Governacio´n)[37],
leaving the direction of the institution to be decided by the
relationship between the leadership of the police and the
president. This decision contradicted the previously agreed
Framework for Democratic Security given that it removes
any functional autonomy of the national police and any lim-
itation in terms of their role in terms of protecting public
security. It also contradicted the General Treaty on Demo-
cratic Security in Central America, in which there is clear
emphasis on the need for an autonomous supervisory body
to oversee the operation of the Police. As analysts recog-
nized [38], without the existence of such an authority or
other suitable mechanisms of control and oversight, there is
always the risk of an abuse of power and failure to protect
the personal security of individuals.
In 2015 the Nicaraguan government also approved the
establishment of a new Sovereign Security Act. The Act’s
stated objective is to “preserve, promote, and maintain
sovereign security” against threats that include transna-
tional organized crime, international terrorism, foreign in-
terference, criminality, rebellion, illicit acts against aviation
and maritime navigation, attacks against cyber security and
infrastructure, or “any illegal act that threatens against the
existence of the Nicaraguan state and its institutions.” Whilst
largely in support of the claims to defend sovereignty and
territorial integrity, civil society organizations in the country
fear that the new act is being misused by the presidency
to outlaw the presence of certain non-governmental orga-
nizations in the country as well as restrict participation in
the national democratic political system. The police’s use of
force to stop and break up protests against the government
or focused on issues such as the proposed canal are now
characterized by government communications as neces-
sary in the interest of pubic security and national strategic
interest. Critics, however, suggest that something else is
occurring [39].
Roberto Cajina (a well known regional security analyst)
in a recent blog-post suggests that the hard handed actions
of the police forces in Managua represents “the profound
systematic crisis in which the Police finds itself, in which
the police are now denaturalized and converted into a body
at the service of a dynastic project and the continuance of
Daniel Ortega” [40]. Further signs that democratic condi-
tions are worsening include the way in which the govern-
ment has used to the judicial system to ban the majority of
the political opposition in the run up to elections in Novem-
ber 2016 [41]. The fact that President Ortega positioned
his wife as candidate for the vice-presidency has also given
further fuel to arguments of the existence of nepotism and
a worsening relationship between the state and community.
These changes indicate a general drift away from earlier
democratic and revolutionary structures and ideas. There
are also specific indications that resulting changes to ev-
eryday policing has had a direct impact on the possibility
to sustain strong community linkages and public respect.
Throughout the country there are falling rates of confidence
in the police and public security. In interviews carried out in
early 2017 analysts and ex-officials detailed at length a se-
ries of factors that demonstrated this falling confidence. Re-
ports produced by research institutions highlight that whilst
homicide rates remain comparatively low; public opinions
regarding security and crime have changed. Critics also
suggest the government’s use of homicide figures alone
is misleading given that they do little as indicators of the
status and quality of policing and public security [42].
According to a survey conducted in 2013 on the topic of
public security by the Institute for Strategic Study (IEEPP),
the majority of people in the survey reported feeling safe
in their neighbourhoods (only 1 in 10 did not) a series of
significant concerns were raised [43,44]. The survey in-
cluded 1,600 interviews with a broad spectrum of the public
and was carried out across 56 municipalities in the country,
including the Atlantic Coast. Robberies remained a concern
(4 of 10), but there was a visible shift to the sectors this
affects. There had been an increase of robberies taking
place not only of homes but of businesses. The increasing
level of drug use in Nicaraguan society has also been a sig-
nificant concern (1 in 10). In 2013 there was an increasing
level of traffic accidents and the lack of police presence was
a problem. Also of note according to the survey was that of
100 hundred people experiencing a crime 49 will not have
made an official report of its occurrence to the police. Many
people responded that they did not report a crime because
it would entail the loss of time and money, and that there is
often poor response and follow up by the police.
In IEEPP’s 8th (2016) survey of public perceptions of
security they report that 48.9% of the population that had
been victims of crime in the final months of that year had
not reported it the police [38]. The explanations for this
ranged between the low levels of seriousness of the crime,
because it was a waste of money and time, the lack of at-
tention and response of the police or fear of reprisals from
criminals. Although the report highlights that confidence in
the police remains comparatively high, negative perceptions
were growing. Respondents to the survey with a negative
perception had grown to what their annual report describes
as an all time high of 16.9%. They also report that there
is an increasing tendency to refer to the operation of the
police force itself, and in particular problematic elements of
its operation to secure local neighbourhoods and transit.
In a number of news reports from 2016 analysts from
the same institution claimed that there was also increasing
evidence of people taking the law into their own hands [45].
In connection with this they point to the rising number of
individuals who have purchased firearms for home protec-
tion. In our interviews with the national police the accuracy
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of claims regarding the increase in the private purchase of
arms is contested [46].
According to a number of our interviewees the transfer-
ence of responsibility for programs aimed at youth, commu-
nity sports, mothers and children and at combatting domes-
tic violence to other government institutions has changed
the quality of police-community relations. Whilst from the
outside these programs appeared to be beyond the bounds
of the public security mandate of the police, they are ac-
knowledged by national analysts as having enabled both a
close and effective relationship between the community and
the police. The recent movement of responsibility for these
programs (the Centros de Juventud remain under police
jurisdiction) whilst given explanation in terms of increas-
ing institutional efficiency, is interpreted at least by some
commentators as a politically motivated strategy by the
Presidency to co-opt the popular support surrounding these
programs. Interview respondents, including ex-police chiefs,
commented in early 2017 that this change was shortsighted
given its effect on COP and the effective flow of information
regarding local conditions of insecurity.
4. Proactive Responses to Insecurity
Family assemblies and heads of sector are two of the dis-
tinctive feature of the Nicaraguan community-policing model.
Indeed, it is these two features are largely recognized as
enabling the Nicaraguan police’s claims to proactivity with
and within the community. These “social technologies” also
stand out in contrast with the more costly technologically
driven and patrolling strategies used by other COP efforts
in Central America.
The family assemblies were established to renew and
to continue the work of the earlier CPCs as participatory-
mechanisms for the expression of popular concerns and
interests. According to Article 290 of the 2013 Constitution
the gabinetes de familia (Family assemblies) are organized
by:
“. . . individual adult men and women, teenagers and
pensioner that live in a community, to reflect on and work
together to promote values and family unity, self-confidence
and mutual esteem, responsibilities, rights and obligations,
communication, co-existence, understanding and a spirit of
community so that they form coherence between how they
think and act”.
By setting a schedule of regular meetings and work-
shops, the assemblies are meant to create spaces where
a series of issues facing the community can be openly dis-
cussed and resolved i.e. health; education; sanitation; the
promotion of local culture and religious festivals; citizens
security; the promotion of the rights of women and children;
the protection of families and their rights; the prevention
and attention of violence against women, inter-family and
youth violence; training and organization to confront natural
disasters, promotion of community identity, and humani-
tarian assistance to cases of abandonment, disability and
dementia. The family assemblies are widely seen by the
people we interviewed as having a significant role in the
solution and mediation of intra-familial violence.
With regards to issues of crime and security in the com-
munity, the gabinetes de familia act as a point of direct ar-
ticulation between community and the police. This is further
facilitated through the direct participation in assembly meet-
ings and seminars of the police’s own heads of sector (jefe de
sector ). These are community police officers that, in contrast
to other Central American policing models, live in rather than
just patrol local neighbourhoods and communities. Indeed,
the jefes de sectors are often recruited from within the same
community that they serve as a police officer. They culti-
vate close community ties through door-to-door visits with
their neighbours and their participation in meetings with local
residents. They also represent a point of articulation with
the national police and the state. As such they ensure that
information gathered from the community is passed directly
up through the chain of command with the national force. As
one sector head stated in a recent article “Our mission is to
guarantee citizen’s security in all aspects, so that the people
are at peace. . . and it is the jefe de sector that has the role
of approaching both the police and the community, so that
the community feels secure and knows to who they should
turn in trying to resolve their problems” [47].
In addition to these two key features of the Nicaraguan
policing model, proactivity in terms of the provision of quick
responses to community concerns and interests has been
aided by the operation of the Centres of Youth Formation
and Development (Centros de Formacio´n y Desarrollo
Juvenil) in Managua and Bluefields—both cities with sig-
nificant problems with juvenile crime (Rodgers 2013). The
centres were set up by the national police in 2011 with the
expressed intention of creating spaces to rescue young
people who have become addicted to drugs or who had
become involved in criminal activities and gangs. A series
of international donors have supported these centres, in-
cluding the Spanish government and the European Union.
The Centres provide these young people with a place to
stay, to take part in social and sporting activities, to learn
about citizenship and to receive vocational training. During
the opening ceremony for the Centre in Managua the First
Commissioner of the National Police Aminta Granera com-
mented [48] on the role that the centres were to play:
“The police are part of the community, not something
distant from it. . . it is important that it moves in unison with
the feelings and life of the community. It is from there that it
can privilege prevention, intimacy, and the protection of peo-
ple in the community. The Youth Centres are the deepest
and visible expression of this spirit of the Police, attempting
to come close to young people in delicate situations, in
situations of risk, not to punish them but to open a space
for their regeneration and formation. It is not about accom-
panying them to the prison, but accompanying them in their
education”.
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4.1. Proactive or Political?
Whilst these three elements of the Nicaraguan COP model
are recognized as essential elements in the proactive re-
sponse to crime, critics voice concerns about the way
in which they also play a political role by embedding the
Ortega Sandinista administration within the community.
When the family assemblies (Gabinetes de familia) were
introduced in 2013 several media channels and analysts
highlighted that this was an attempt to impose a particular
model of citizen control in the country. As mentioned above
the family assemblies were meant to replace and update
the role of the previous Citizens Power Councils. However,
observers also noted that this really meant the formation of
a closer relationship with the particular interests of Ortega,
in contrast to a broader conception of deliberative democ-
racy [49]. Indeed, it was observed that the assemblies were
part of a policy package initiated by the first lady, Ortega’s
wife Rosario Murillo, termed Vivir bien, vivir bonito, vivir
sano (Live well, live beautifully, live healthily). At the time
of their introduction a deputy of the Movimiento Renovador
Sandinista (MRS) was reported as saying that the assem-
blies:
“Clearly politicize public policy. Now to have access to
public benefits you need to have connections to the gov-
erning party, now called family assemblies. They are going
to create more discrimination and exclusion compared to
what there is at present” [50].
According to an opinion piece written for the La Prensa
newspaper, although given legal validity by the Family Code
(Co´digo de la Familia) the assemblies “violate the princi-
ples of liberty, affecting rights and distorting the true con-
ceptualization of citizens participation” [51]. Although the
national constitution emphasizes the freedom of religion
and expression, according to paragraph 32 of the Code, the
assemblies must aspire to Christian values, Socialist ide-
als and practices of solidarity. In listing the positive values
of the assemblies another report emphasizes the manner
in which the assemblies are formed to promote “Christian
values, family values and unity, self-confidence and esteem
for others, responsibility, rights and duties, communication
and harmony” [52]. Article 49 of the national constitution
establishes the right of Nicaraguan citizens to organize on
the basis of their willing participation and election of citizens,
something that is in clear contrast to the specified form of
behavior and principles written into the Family Code.
Although not stated in quite so strong terms, there was
acknowledgement in our recent interviews that the Jefes
de Sector and Centros de Juventud might also operate
as mechanisms to cultivate support for the Ortega admin-
istration. Some interview respondent voiced the opinion
that whilst the Youth Centers played an important role in
reducing youth crime they did not agree with the “political
re-education” provided there.
With regards to the jefes de sector party alliances were
more commonly connected with problems of institutional
stagnation. Indeed, a number of interview respondents
commented on the manner in which party alliances and
control negatively affected the growth and professional de-
velopment of the national police as a whole. Because the
administration controlled appointments and promotions at
the top and bottom of the police’s institutional structure
a number of problematic tendencies could be observed.
Party alliances meant that there was a high degree of circu-
lation of the same people for top positions, and control over
the acceptance of candidates into the role of jefes de sec-
tor. These alliances also meant that over time there was an
over promotion of people at the top of the institution, and
very little at the bottom (once in their role as jefes de sector
police officers have little opportunity to move elsewhere in
the institution) resulting in an overly top-heavy and aging
leadership structure. Indeed, having reached the top there
was commonly nowhere else for well-qualified people to
go, as there was little emphasis placed on further educa-
tion and specialization. As one ex-director of the national
police commented in an interview with us “Nicaragua is
now known in the region to have more leaders than follow-
ers, at the same time as wages at the upper level of the
national police remain low compared to other countries
in the region”. The ex-director also emphasized what he
saw as a clear need for a generational shift in command
in order to respond to the changing values and mindset
of the population. Following the recent national security
reforms, the regulations for appointments (Article 47, Law
872) were changed allowing Aminta Granera to remain
indefinitely in her position as First Commissioner of the
National Police [53]. Granera chose to leave her position
as Police commisioner following the unrest in 2018.
As much as political alliances and relationships are re-
sponsible for problematic actions they are also held re-
sponsible for certain forms of inaction. Numerous news
reports within and without Nicaragua highlight the active
role that the police have had in quelling political rallies and
demonstrations [54,55]. However, news reports covering
the occurrence of land invasions and conflicts surround-
ing mining in the Autonomous Regions of Nicaragua have
tended to highlight the absence of action by the national
police [56,57].
The Autonomous Regions of Nicaragua—the North At-
lantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and the South Atlantic
Autonomous Region (RAAS)—were created in 1987 and
elected their first regional governments in 1990. The cre-
ation of the Autonomous regions, where semi-autonomous
status is given to various forms of local community lead-
ership forms, reflects the region’s contrasting history of
indigenous ethnicity [58], political alliances (the focus of
the Contras struggle in the 80s) and largely separate and
poorer economic circumstances to the rest of the country.
The communities that make up the population [59] of the Au-
tonomous Atlantic Regions are located in territories—often
with high ecologic and environmental vulnerability—with a
strong sense of ownership of communal lands in coastal
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and forest areas. The creation of these regions created
a new layer of government that would, at least in theory,
grant greater “local” control to indigenous communities and
traditional peoples over these regions and their natural re-
sources. The constitution recognizes the right of Caribbean
Coast communities to preserve and develop their cultural
identity, forms of organization and property, as well as the
use and enjoyment of “the waters and forests of their com-
munal lands” (Art. 89) Larsen & Lewis Mendoza 201 [60].
The autonomy statute established the regional councils as
the “maximum authority of the regional autonomous gov-
ernment”. The councils are entities created for deliberation,
resolution, regional public policy formation and negotiation.
The national police and the military retain however the role
of the enforcement of law and order in the Autonomous
regions in communication with these local authorities.
While then there is an agreement on the provision of
security to local communities by officials of the Nicaraguan
state, the Autonomous Atlantic Regions have remained a
zone of periodic violence, quite in contrast to the rest of
the nation. Twenty one indigenous men have been killed
since 2014, women raped and dozens more wounded or
kidnapped in connection with a series of confrontations
over land and resources. Local non-governmental organiza-
tions blame the violence on the increasing waves of settlers
that have headed to the Atlantic coast because of severe
droughts in the West of the country that have decimated
farming and cattle ranching.
The government’s support for the construction of a new
trans-oceanic canal is also widely recognized as a cause
of recent unrest in the region [61]. A study carried out
at the beginning of 2015 by the Nicaraguan Network for
Democracy signals that the construction of the canal would
result in the displacement of more than a 100,000 inhab-
itants across 13 different municipalities. The report also
describes the experiences of local inhabitants in the Atlantic
region affected by the state’s preparations for the project.
These include experiences of fear, intimidation, physical
threats and an invasion of their personal privacy by police
and security forces, and in particular of those involved in
local protests.
The development of a series of gold mines in the North-
ern Autonomous District has also acted as a magnet for
people seeking employment and wealth. The law—based
on a 2001 landmark case [62]—requires outsiders, includ-
ing the national government, to request permission from
local authorities before they can buy or settle land. The
violence has indicated that the law is not only being ignored,
but that land has been taken by force. Importantly, it is
also claimed that because of political linkages that exist
between the government administration and the colonos
(colonizers) the police and military have been instructed to
not intervene in the conflicts. Some say that the National
Sandinista Liberation Front is hoping to repopulate a region
that was largely anti-Sandinista during the civil war in the
1980s, and gain access to valuable natural resources such
as lumber and gold [63]. Indigenous leaders claim that
local functionaries of the government with connections to
the timber companies have been assisting the colonizers
to access automatic weapons [64]. Sadly as the violence
connected to land invasion in the Atlantic north continues
an increasing number of people are reported by the local
media to have been displaced from their ancestral lands.
As a result many Nicaraguan families are reported to have
moved across the Honduran border.
5. Preventative Policing
The first voices critical of hard-line approaches in dealing
with youth violence in Central America appeared in the
late 1990s [65]. Research supported by universities and
NGOs questioned the effectiveness of reactive models in
policing dealing with this problem. Of the Central Ameri-
can police institutions, the Nicaraguan police were the first
to address the difficulties of a predominantly repressive
approach toward youth violence in 2001 [65]. Experience
from the operation of a reactive approach, called Plan de
Pandillas (Anti-gangs Plan) demonstrated that whilst suc-
cessful in immediately reducing youth violence, it was less
successful in delivering sustainability and legitimacy. It was
argued that the Plan de Pandillas would not resolve the
underlying causes of youth violence. On the contrary the
reactive approach could turn the majority of the young and
predominantly male adolescents into threats to security.
In contrast to this experience, an alternative project was
implemented by the local government in the nearby town
of Masaya combining measures of crime control with pre-
vention activities. The successful outcome of this project
spread to other cities such as Jinotepe and Leon and would
also become one of the foundations for the updating of
citizens councils and the introduction of the family assem-
blies mentioned above [65]. Also importantly with regards
to the prevention of youth violence the project would re-
sult in the implementation of a broadly new strategy i.e.
1) an approach targeted to the criteria of different groups,
2) home visits to families with adolescents in risk groups,
3) organisation of civic work for youth at risk and 4) pre-
vention activities at the community level. The Police also
established a Directorate of Youth Affairs in 2003 at the na-
tional and departmental levels. It would be this Directorate
that would also assume responsibility for the management
of the Centres for Youth Training and Development—also
mentioned above. This change towards an understanding
that is Ma´s Vale Prevenir Que Reprimir (Better to Prevent
than Punish) is attributed with significant improvement in
the indicators of youth violence in the country [66]. The
number of youth gangs recorded in Managua decreased
from over 118 in 2002 to approximately 34 in 2005 [67].
In an interview in February 2017 [68], (Now First) Com-
missioner General Xavier Davila Rueda made the claim that
the operation of the jefes de sector were to a large degree
responsible for preventing the spread of armed gangs and
narcotics in Nicaraguan cities. They were key to the predic-
tive and analytical capacity of the police. When attempts
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have been made by gangs and criminal cartels to estab-
lish themselves in communities the interaction between the
sector heads and the family assemblies meant that they
were immediately informed on, allowing for further targeted
action by the national authorities to be taken. The jefes de
sector represents in this way a low-tech mechanism with
which to form human and low-cost lines of communication
between the community and state authorities. Moreover
they enable sensitivity by the police to the particular con-
cerns of the local community such as robbery, drugs and
delinquency. This is also significant given that the level of
technical support to the Nicaraguan police—in rural areas
in particular—is comparatively low (e.g. in my interviews
with jefes de sector in Bluefields it became clear that police
officers do not commonly carry radios, do not have regular
access to information technologies, nor have designated
motorised transport).
In discussing the role and importance of the jefes de
sector in a recent interview [69] a former police officer
offered the following comment:
Community is a central element of community policing,
but something else is also important: control over territorial
information. . . With jefes de sector there will be one for the
urban area, one for the semi-rural, and another for the rural
area. The jefe de sector should have an operative man-
date. . . a perimeter of 5 km2, and they should know that in
this area there is an area of 2 km2 with 400 houses, that
there are commercial areas between the houses, there is
a cafe, ten businesses, the owners of these are so and so,
their specializations such and such. . . They should know
all of the details of their zone, and about all of the people
who live there. . . A distinctive feature is also that they not
only visit, they live there. The preventive work is to be seen
in the neighbourhood, to celebrate a child’s birthday with
the pin˜ata, close the street if necessary. . . They are invited
to all these kinds of event. So, for the jefe de sector their
operative mandate are all local details, whilst for the local
community this is balanced with them being present in the
community and walking the streets.
5.1. From Preventative to Precarious?
The close ties formed through the relationships between the
jefes de sector and the family assemblies have enabled the
Nicaraguan police to succeed with little (in a financial and
material sense). However, the occurrence of violence in the
Atlantic Autonomous regions might not only be explained by
dynamics of colonization and party alliances, but by the fact
that the police are simply not sufficiently present in these
areas of tension. According to a recent report there were
11,700 active personnel, 30 percent of them women, in
2011, giving the country a rate of 199 officers per 100,000
inhabitants, which is low relative to the region, and signifi-
cantly below the world average of 300 [70]. The number of
officers is up from 10,500 in 2010. Some 1,200 new officers
entered the force in 2011, setting a record for the biggest
expansion in a single year. According to news report from
2015, the size of the police force is currently at the level of
13,000 personnel [71]. Given that the national population
is over 3 million and that most of the police personnel are
located in urban centers, there are large areas of the coun-
try where police coverage is very low—including the rural
areas of the Atlantic autonomous regions. According to the
local police commissioner in Bluefields there are only 265
police officers in the entire Southern Autonomous district
(over 27,000 km2).
The placement of jefes de sector in rural communities
assists the creation of a police presence, but it is also ev-
ident that many of these officers are incredibly isolated in
terms of necessary back up when serious crime occurs. Left
largely on their own within local communities it is possible—
as some of our interview respondents suggested—that the
jefes de sector are more susceptible to bribery and cor-
ruption, as well as the misuse of their position of power.
Indeed, it is clearly possible that because of the low territo-
rial coverage of the police in Nicaragua in many cases crime
may go unregistered by the national authorities. In 2016
and the start of 2017 the national police presented a 15%
reduction in the reporting of crime as a sign of their suc-
cess. A direct correlation was made by the police command
between reductions in reports of crime with a reduction in
crime. However, as highlighted above, reports on citizen
security carried out by independent analysts highlight the
decrease in confidence that the public have in the police. It
is suggested that the public have stopped reporting crime
because the police fail to properly investigate and follow up
on crime [72].
Whereas the model for community based policing in
Nicaragua has had significant success there are also signs
that the national administration is encouraging a turn to-
wards more heavy-handed tactics in an effort to make up
for poor coverage. In rural areas the military have always
had a role in the provision of security, and taken a particu-
lar role in combatting the transportation of narcotics along
the Nicaraguan Atlantic coast. The presence of specially
trained militarized police units have, however, also become
increasingly evident in Managua and Bluefields. In the case
of Managua this is officially a response to a number of vi-
olent crimes in the city [73]. The police have now put into
place the “Plan for the Strengthening of Security in the City
of Managua” which according to official information is led
by the Directorate of Special Police Operations (DOEP).
It also involves the expanded use of the black uniformed
Dantos Brigade in patrols and responses to reported violent
crime in public spaces. According to a recent blog post by
Roberto Cajina this is a sign that “the Police have lost their
capacity to prevent and to be proactive, that they have lost
their capacity to anticipate actions and guarantee the secu-
rity of the population” [72]. Law 872 of the National Police
Law establishes that the DOEP is a specialized department
of the Police that “corresponds with the intervention to re-
store public order in serious altercations, to participate in
special operations against drug trafficking, terrorism, orga-
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nized crime and other serious crimes”. This is first time that
the DOEP has been tasked with the response to everyday
crimes. According to Cajina this is “the unfolding of the
police special forces in the application of a “heavy hand”
policy in response to common crime” [72].
The clear participation of the Dantos Brigade and
the DOEP in the recent scenes of violence and police-
community confrontations appears to support this argument.
A series of protest were sparked in April 2018 following
the decision by the Nicaraguan government to introduce
cuts to pensions that would increase workers contributions
and reduce overall benefits [74]. Although the government
would cancel the welfare reform in response to the initial un-
rest, protest has nonetheless spread largely because of the
heavy handed police response and government administra-
tions claims that protest was the result of political manipula-
tion by opposition groups. On the Atlantic Coast anger also
boiled over into violent protest due to the perceived failure
of police and governmental response to wildfires in the In-
dio Maı´z biosphere [75]. Media coverage highlighted the
presence of the black uniforms of the Dantos Brigade at the
center of the violence both in the initial protests and multiple
confrontations that would take place in Managua, Masaya
and Bluefields in following weeks and months [76]. There
are no reports of the military having intervened in these
confrontations [75]. International and national media cov-
erage has also emphasized the apparent alliance between
the unit and balaclava clad para-police groups otherwise
in civilian clothing. Media articles suggest that these para-
police groups are civilian volunteers from the Sandinista
FSLN party [77]. The Nicaraguan government denies this
[78]. The government claims that these groups represent
criminal and interventionist interests including the United
States [77]. It is these groups that are together attributed
with the killing of c300 civilians [79] and continuing threats
made to community and opposition activists. This violence
has in turn generated a wave of condemnation from the
international community, including calls for the Nicaraguan
government to call early elections and the US government’s
proposal of a trade embargo of the country [80–82].
For some of the leadership of the National Police the
return to a more political, presidential and militarized form
of policing is a return to its historic Sandinista identity. In
contrast, Cajina suggests this is “self-deception” [83]. He
suggests that the National Police increasingly serve the
President, and not the citizens. Even if there was a return to
a more revolutionary ethos within the leadership of the na-
tional police, our interview respondents were also clear that
it would no longer provide sufficient guidance to the force
as a whole. A number of respondents made it clear that
young people who are recruited into the police, including
to work as jefes de sector, now had “more of an experi-
ence of poverty, than the ethics of the revolution”. This
made it difficult for young recruits to relate to or “to learn
from the sayings of their elders” (aprender desde los dichos
de sus mayores). The formal requirements of the recruit-
ment process to the National Police states that candidates
must be a Nicaraguan citizen, be of honorable behavior
and vocation, have a good reputation and prestige in the
community where they reside, and not have any previous
criminal record. It is, however, also recognized by the police
that many of those attracted to join the police do so, not
out of a desire to serve the community, but because of a
shortage of other economic alternatives [84].
These dynamics appear to suggest that the claims to
preventative policing are under increasing pressure and
contradiction. Indeed, regional dynamics in the Americas
in general indicate that these pressures are likely to grow
significantly in the years to come. The entire system of the
Nicaraguan police is challenged by increasing efforts by the
drug cartels and regionally based youth gangs to establish
bridgeheads within the country, and within the Atlantic Au-
tonomous regions in particular. Although geographically
distant from Nicaragua the recent shift in the direction of US
foreign policy and increased controls over immigration are
also likely to end both the pressure valve of youth migration
and remittances. With the disappearance of these oppor-
tunities tensions in the country are growing—particularly
under the apparent current climate of presidentialism—and
an increasing number of young people are pushed to either
join criminal activities or join the police force out of necessity
rather than conviction.
6. Conclusions
With its low levels of homicide and violent crime Nicaragua
stands in strong contrast with the countries of the North-
ern Triangle. As has been discussed above, it is evident
that the Nicaraguan model for community based policing
(COP) has contributed significantly to these conditions. The
Nicaraguan model for COP differed from others in the region
due to its rejection of reactive policing and development of
a system that emphasizes communitarian, proactive and
preventative goals. Through the use of these guiding values
and institutional structures the Nicaraguan COP model has
until very recently depended much more on “social capital”
(networks of relationships between people among people
who live in a particular society), than other Central Ameri-
can COP models where high levels of financing, numbers
of personnel and electronic information technology play
a greater role [85]. The Nicaraguan COP model still car-
ries some of the revolutionary ideals of Sandinista history.
These are put into practice through the formation of a series
of specific institutional structures, key amongst which are
the family assemblies (gabinetes de familia), the sector or
neighborhood officers (jefes de sector ) and youth centers
(centros de formacio´n y desarrollo juvenil). Through these
structures the national police were able to not only generate
a strong contact with the local community, but ensure the
rapid exchange of information regarding crime and local
development concerns. They also enabled the police to
proactively identify particular threats at an earlier stage and
efficiently intervene to prevent and remove these risks. This
has been particularly effective in containing the spread of
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youth gangs and organized criminal cartels attempting to
operate in urban centres on Nicaragua soil.
Whilst in this way we corroborate earlier claims regard-
ing the success of the Nicaraguan COP model, we also rec-
ognize that this model is currently under erosion. Changing
circumstances make claims that it represents an example of
good practice in public security increasingly untenable. The
extraordinary violence and public unrest of recent months
demonstrate that trust between the police and community,
and the government and community are no longer what
they once were. Public opinion regarding citizen’s security
and the efficiency of the police appears to be changing.
Homicide levels are down according to official police statis-
tics, but other reports suggest that robbery and drug related
crime is growing in the cities. Whilst less crime is reported,
indicators also suggest that fewer people trust the police
to follow up on reported crime. It is also clear that the Or-
tega government recent efforts to bolster presidential power
by restraining political opposition in parliament, by quelling
public protest in the streets and by placing a series of public
institutions directly under its control has had an impact on
public trust in the state and police. As a result of the insti-
tutional changes made by the government, the police now
have a permanent first commissioner and many of its so-
cial programmes, such as with women, removed from their
control. Whilst the government argues for this in terms of
bureaucratic efficiency, the removal of these responsibilities
from the police has also removed vital points of communica-
tion with the community. The key institutional mechanisms
mentioned above continue to function, but increasing cri-
tique is made of the way in which the Ortega government’s
particular brand of ideology i.e. Sandinismo mixed with
conservative Catholicism, has intervened in their operation.
Whilst there has been a long process to bolster profession-
alism in the national police, the tendency to promote some
officers on the basis of party loyalties has resulted in an
overly top-heavy leadership structure that it is little inter-
ested in innovation or renewal. Party alliance appears to be
proactively replacing democratic communitarianism as the
defining characteristic of who receives attention from these
instances.
Concurrent with a politically driven erosion of police pro-
fessionalism, it is also evident that there are a series of
challenges to the Nicaraguan COP model’s claims to be
proactive and preventative. Indeed, it appears that issue of
political alliances is at least a feature of the growing inability
of the national police to respond to the growing levels of vio-
lence and insecurity developing in the Atlantic Autonomous
Regions. In this context the police not only appear partisan,
but are also failing to actively prevent rising tensions and
further conflict. Certainly there seems to be a persisting gap
in cultural and political respect and understanding between
authorities in Managua and customary defined authorities
of the Autonomous Regions. As we have described above,
whilst the jefes de sector have had considerable success in
urban areas, the low numbers of police in general and their
frequent isolation with little technical and logistical back-up
in rural areas is also a cause for concern. Claims of the
involvement of jefes de sector in corruption and the misuse
of power need to be taken seriously, particularly if this also
takes on a partisan character.
The move by the national police to rely on specially
trained armed units can also be seen as a politically driven
move away from preventative policing. Whilst argued on
the basis of a necessary reactive response to a recent rise
in violent crime, the appearance of these units on neigh-
bourhood patrols and civil protests has added further to
the perception of institutional crisis and a politically driven
attack on the foundational democratic values and action
goals of the police. This has never been more evident than
now in the context of current violent confrontations between
the Dantos Brigade, para-police and community and oppo-
sition organizations. Indeed, as the institutional structures
stagnate because of political favouritism, there is an in-
creasing gap between the revolutionary rhetoric of its upper
command with the actions and lived reality of economic
hardship and exclusion experienced by both those newly
drawn into its ranks and the community amongst which it
aims to win hearts and minds. Changing regional condi-
tions do not make this situation any easier. At a time when
democracy is constrained, socio-economic differences are
worsening and police presence is low and increasingly lack-
ing in trust, it is becoming easier for the gangs and criminal
cartels to solidly establish themselves in Nicaragua. The
Nicaraguan model of community policing has functioned
well under previous moments of extreme stress, such as the
Contras struggle, but the institutional conditions surround-
ing its anchorage in the state and community have changed
significantly.
Taken together these conclusions suggest that in a
search for a critical foundation for human security—one
not only concerned with public order, but public well-being—
Nicaragua needs to end the drift away from the original
principles established for its model of community based
policing. This we suggest should include reconsideration of
the sociological and democratic foundations of the models
original principles i.e. policing not in service of an authori-
tarian government but of service to and integration within
the community. The effort to place these principles in prac-
tice serve as an explanation of the country’s success in
limiting crime in the past despite extremely challenging
socio-economic conditions. The current government’s ap-
parent departure from adherence to these principles is at
least part of the negative tendencies and current failures in
policing. The model’s, albeit now more historic than current
emphasis on community or “social capital” also provides
Nicaraguans, and perhaps populations beyond its borders,
with a reminder that there are significant alternatives. In
other contexts, analysts make a similar point in stating that
an increase in public order policing will not help. In re-
sponse to a context of social public order gone wrong the
police need to become complicit or partisan towards the
citizens that they serve [86]. Indeed, as has been more
obvious in the current national crisis, the history of COP
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in Nicaragua makes evident that there are alternatives to
the dominant regional trends of policing [87,88] e.g. that
emphasize centralized leadership, militarization and an over
reliance on the use of expensive technologies (information,
communication, monitoring, weaponry etc.) at the expense
of trust and human security.
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